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Abstract: 
The process by which people transfer their allegiance from ethnic to national identities is highly 
topical yet somewhat opaque.  Here I argue that one of the key determinants of national 
identification is membership in a “core” ethnic group, or Staatsvolk, and whether or not that group 
is in power.  I use the example of Uganda as well as Afrobarometer data to show that, when the 
core ethnic group is in power (as measured by the ethnic identity of the President), members of 
this group identify more with the nation, but when this group is out of power members actually 
identify more with their ethnic group.  This finding has important implications for the study of 
nationalism, ethnicity and African politics. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 One of the greatest questions in the social sciences is the origins and variation in the 
strength of nationalism, which itself is predicated on the two ideas that people identify with a 
collective group known as a nation and that this nation should have a state of its own.  While the 
latter of these two ideas, which can be characterized as the ideology of nationalism, has received a 
lot of attention within various disciplines, there has been less attention to the former idea about 
national identification, especially as regards the choice people make to identify with the nation 
versus a sub-national or ethnic identity.  Indeed, the empirical literature on this topic has been quite 
slim, in part because large-scale survey data that asked individuals to choose between their ethnic 
and national identity has only been collected in recent years.  More specifically, in large cross-
national surveys this question has only been asked to respondents in the Afrobarometer project in 
Africa and the World Values Survey more widely, with researchers finding various individual, 
regional-level and country-level correlates of national identification, such as education and income 
at the individual level and GDP/capita at the regional and country level.1  The literature also 
suggests that the size of one’s ethnic group has either a positive2 or negative3 relationship with 
national identification, and that there is a positive relationship between national identification and 
whether or not an ethnic group was partitioned by colonialism.4 
 However, it is not clear that the size of an ethnic group and its degree of colonial partition 
are all that matters for ethnic groups when it comes to their relationship with the nation-state.  
Indeed, the literature on nationalism has long discussed the fact that some ethnic groups have 
historically constituted the core ethnic group of the state, such that they have been termed a 
                                               
1 Ahlerup, Baskaran, and Bigsten, 2017; Masella 2013; Robinson 2014. 
2 Robinson 2014. 
3 Masella 2013. 
4 Robinson 2014. 
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Staatsvolk or state-people by various authors.5  In countries such as Denmark, France, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the UK in Europe and Cambodia, China, Korea, Thailand, 
Vietnam and Japan in East Asia, members of the ethnic core historically controlled the state and 
redefined their ethnic group as the new national community in the modern era, thereby 
encouraging everyone in peripheral groups to assimilate into the nation.6  Indeed, the classic 
example of this process took place in France as documented extensively by Eugen Weber,7 who 
showed how economic growth, the extension of public services and military conscription all led to 
the incorporation of ethno-linguistic minorities into the French nation during the 19th and early 20th 
centuries.  There is of course debate in all of these cases of the degree to which this process 
involved incorporating peripheral groups into a pre-existing group or involved a degree of 
accommodation of minority ethnic cultures into a new national community,8 but the general idea of 
the ethnic core having main elements of its culture redefined as the cultural components of the new 
nation holds in these cases. 
 As such in this paper I examine the relationship between membership in the ethnic core 
and national identification.  I argue that this relationship is determined by whether or not the ethnic 
core controls the state, as proxied by the ethnic identity of the President or Head of Government, 
such that ethnic cores in power will tend to identify more with the nation while those out of power 
identify more with their ethnic group.  I use evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa (henceforth Africa) 
because, unlike most of the rest of the world, the relatively small average size of core ethnic 
groups means that there is sufficient variation in the degree to which they hold power.  Indeed, 
whereas throughout Europe, North America and East Asia it is very unusual for ethnic cores to not 
                                               
5 Connor 1994; Gat 2013; Hechter 1975, 5; Hobsbawm 1992, 36, 73; O'Leary 2001; Wimmer 2002, 69.  
Other names given to the ethnic core include “dominant ethnie” (Smith 1991, 39) and “leading nation” 
(Hobsbawm 1992, 36). 
6 Smith 1991, 55. 
7 Weber 1976. 
8 Smith 1991, 54-59; Wimmer 2008, 1032. 
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hold power, in Africa it is quite common due to the fact that they rarely comprise a majority of the 
population.9 
I use two methodological approaches to provide evidence for my argument.  First, I provide 
a detailed examination of the case of the Buganda core ethnic group within Uganda, which shows 
how being out of power can lead to disillusionment with the nation and even calls for secession for 
members of the core group.  Secondly, I use data on twenty-two African countries from round five 
of the Afrobarometer project, whereby thirteen ethnic cores were in power and nine were out of 
power at the time that the survey was collected.  I use multi-level hierarchical modelling to show 
that members of ethnic cores in states where the core is in power are more likely to identify with 
the nation than with their ethnic group, but that this relationship is reversed when the core is out of 
power.  I show that this result is robust to controlling for a wide variety of individual-, ethnic group- 
and country-level controls, the use of sub-samples and the use of a smaller sample of countries 
from round four of the Afrobarometer project.  Finally, I utilize multiple rounds of the Afrobarometer 
project to create a panel and show that having an ethnic core in power adds on average 12% to 
the percentage of people who identify with the nation, thereby cancelling out the average negative 
effect of British colonialism on national identification. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In section two I show the existence of ethnic 
cores in Africa, as measured by the location of capital cities, the cores’ political dominance, and 
their history of assimilating ethnic minorities when in power.  In section three I develop my 
hypothesis about how state power is the crucial determinant of whether or not members of ethnic 
cores will identify more with the nation or their ethnic group.  Section four discusses the case study 
of the Baganda in Uganda, while section five examines quantitative results using data from the 
Afrobarometer project.  Finally, in section six I conclude. 
 
2. Ethnic Cores and National Identity in Africa 
                                               
9 Regardless of their status as ethnic cores, the largest ethnic group in Sub-Saharan Africa comprises on 
average only 41% of the population, compared to averages of 69% in Latin America/Caribbean, 72% in Asia 
and 73% in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Fearon 2003, 204).  It is for this reason that I do 
not use the World Value Survey data mentioned above. 
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Ethnic cores have been identified in Europe, East Asia and the settler colonies of North 
America and Oceania without a similar discussion of their existence in the post-colonial world, 
especially Sub-Saharan Africa.  Certainly much of the reason why scholars of nationalism like 
Anthony Smith have explicitly denied the existence of ethnic cores in Africa revolves around the 
fact that much of the cultural trappings of modern national identities, specifically language and 
religion, derive in the post-colonial world not from the ethnic core but rather from the former 
colonial ruler.10  Indeed, due to colonialism a majority of countries in Africa have Christianity as the 
majority religion while a majority continue to use the colonial lingua franca as their official 
language.11  Similarly, for many countries in Europe and East Asia the ethnic core held political 
power and expanded its control over neighbouring territories, whose populations it assimilated over 
a period of time; in contrast, the borders of African states derive from colonial decisions taken by 
Europeans in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.12 
Yet if we consider ethnic cores merely to be the core communities around which modern 
national identities are constructed, then there is strong evidence that ethnic cores do exist in Africa 
in the same way as they do elsewhere.  More specifically, it is possible to see the existence of 
ethnic cores in Africa in terms of three characteristics, each leading from the previous one: the 
placement of the national capital, the core’s political dominance, and a history of assimilation into – 
and out of – the dominant core group.  I examine each of these in turn. 
 Firstly, the location of capital cities around the world can usually be a clue to the existence 
of ethnic cores, especially where the capital city is far away from the geographical centre of the 
state.  London, Paris and Stockholm are all examples of cities that were capitals of the 
                                               
10 Smith 1991, p. 41. 
11 Of course, there are obvious exceptions in both cases: Ethiopia’s dominant language and religion both 
derive from its ethnic core group, the Amhara, while the national or official languages of Madagascar, 
Somalia, Sudan and Tanzania are those of their ethnic cores. 
12 Here again there are exceptions: most modern states with ethnic cores in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union had their borders drawn in the early 20th century by either the victors of World War I or by 
Soviet ethnographers, respectively. 
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geographical homelands of ethnic cores13 which, upon the geographical and demographic 
expansion of the ethnic core into the modern nation-state, continued to be capital cities despite 
their distance from the geographical centroid of the new state.  In the same way, the capital cities 
of Burkina Faso (Ouagadougou), Madagascar (Antananarivo) and Uganda (Kampala) were capital 
cities of their respective ethnic core states in the pre-colonial period and were chosen by the 
European colonizers as colonial capital cities despite the fact that the new colonies encompassed 
many more ethnic groups than the ethnic core.  In other cases such as Nigeria (Lagos), Niger 
(Zinder), Tanzania (Bagamoyo and then Dar es Salaam) and Mozambique (Island of 
Mozambique), the colonialists initially chose capital cities in the homelands of the ethnic core 
groups only to see the capital moved at a later date, mostly because of the fact that the original 
capital was too far from the centroid of the modern state.14 
 Secondly, in part due to the location of the capital city in their geographical homelands, 
ethnic cores have dominated politics in modern nation-states, often disproportionately to their 
actual numbers.  Examples abound: out of the forty-four Presidents of the United States, forty-
three have been white and forty-three have been Protestant, despite the fact that whites and 
Protestants only comprised 64% and 47% of the population in the most recent US census, 
respectively.  In many countries ethnic cores similarly dominate politics to the exclusion of ethnic 
minorities: in the UK, for example, only one Prime Minister out of seventy-five dating back to the 
early eighteenth century has been from Wales (namely David Lloyd George), despite the fact that 
the Welsh have comprised roughly between 5 and 7% of the total UK population over the past 200 
years.  Similarly, in Eastern Europe no member of an ethnic minority has ever become the Head of 
Government in modern Bulgaria (with ethnic minorities comprising 10% of the population) or 
Romania (also 10%), or in post-Soviet Estonia (31%), Lithuania (16%) or Russia (19%), among 
others.  In East Asia there has never been an ethnic minority Head of State in the modern history 
of Vietnam (14% minority) or in modern China (8%).  In Africa there are several countries where 
ethnic cores are a minority of the population but have held the Presidency for a majority of years 
                                               
13 Specifically England, Île-de-France and Svealand, respectively. 
14 Bandyopadhyay and Green 2013. 
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since independence, specifically Cameroon (with the Beti-Pahuin as the ethnic core), Côte d'Ivoire 
(Akan), Malawi (Chewa), Mali (Bambara) and Senegal (Wolof).  Indeed, in some of these cases the 
ethnic core has dominated the Presidency despite their small numbers: in Guinea, for instance, the 
Mandinka or Malinke are only some 25% of the population but have held the Presidency for 34 out 
of 59 years since independence, while the Kikuyu in Kenya are only 20-22% of the population but 
have held the Presidency for 30 out of 54 years since independence. 
 Third and finally, ethnic cores tend to be the largest ethnic groups in their respective 
countries, albeit with notable exceptions as noted below.  As a result some authors have merely 
assumed that the ethnic core is the largest ethnic group by definition,15 thereby implicitly assuming 
that its size is exogenous to its status as the ethnic core.  Yet there is a great deal of evidence of 
assimilation into ethnic cores around the world as members of minority groups decide to join the 
core group for better access to political, economic or social power.  Indeed, one of the main 
reasons why ethnic cores tend to be the largest ethnic group in their respective countries is 
because of a long history of assimilating smaller ethnic groups, especially when they hold state 
power.  Perhaps the most famous example again comes from France, where many Alsatians, 
Basques and Bretons re-identified as French in the century prior to World War I,16 but other 
European examples of assimilation into the ethnic core include the Cornish of the UK, Laz of 
Turkey and Sorbs of Germany, among many others.17  The same process has been quite common 
in Africa, where there is abundant evidence of minority assimilation into ethnic cores from the pre-
colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras in Gambia,18 Liberia,19 Sudan,20 Togo21 and Zambia,22 
among other cases. 
                                               
15 O'Leary 2001. 
16 Weber 1976. 
17 Hann and Béller-Hann 1998; Hastings 1997, 66-67; Stone 1972. 
18 Wright 1985. 
19 Akpan 1973. 
20 Deng 1999. 
21 Nugent 2008. 
22 Posner 2003. 
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It is important to note that these African examples of assimilation all derive either from 
periods where the ethnic core was in power at the national level or during from the colonial era, 
when indirect rule policies generated strong incentives for Africans to assimilate into the dominant 
ethnic core in their region of residence.  In contrast, when ethnic cores are not in power, formerly 
assimilated members have in many instances revived their older identities and thus “de-
assimilated,” which can lead to resentment among members of the ethnic core who have seen 
their numbers diminish.  This phenomenon was most obvious during the Soviet Union and its 
aftermath, where various ethnic republics were created and governments altered policies favouring 
titular ethnic core groups, which had the effect of either promoting or discouraging assimilation.23  
In Africa a comparable example comes from Ethiopia, where the Amhara formerly dominated the 
state for centuries under the Solomonic dynasty, leading to the imposition of the Amharic language 
and the Ethiopian Orthodox church as the state language and religion, respectively.  As such many 
Ethiopians from minority ethnic groups assimilated into the Amhara ethnic group over time in order 
to access power in the feudal hierarchy.24  This situation, however, came to an end when rebel 
leader Meles Zenawi, from the minority Tigrayan ethnic group, took power in 1991 and 
subsequently both allowed Eritrea to secede and created a system of ethnic federalism for the 
remaining provinces in Ethiopia that greatly diminished the incentives for identification as Amhara 
among formerly oppressed minority groups such as the Oromo.  As a result the Amhara have seen 
a noticeable demographic decline over the past quarter-century relative to other ethnic groups: 
while in the 1984 Ethiopian census they were 0.7% smaller than the largest ethnic group in 
Ethiopia, the Oromo (28.3% vs. 29.0%), by the 1994 census they had become 2.0% smaller than 
the Oromo and were 7.6% smaller than the Oromo in the 2007 census. 
 
3. Ethnic Cores and State Power 
 
                                               
23 Gorenburg 1999; Safran 2008. 
24 Levine 1974. 
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 The literature on ethnic cores and nationalism has generally focussed on the history of how 
these cores expanded to encompass the modern nation to which they gave their name, without 
much attention to how ethnic cores have fared within these new modern nations.25  Indeed, while 
modern nations may have taken on the name and many of the trappings of their ethnic cores, this 
does not mean that the ethnic cores have completely disappeared or become irrelevant.  Instead, 
what arguably matters for members of these core groups is whether or not they hold power in the 
modern states.  In the “older” nation-states of Europe and East Asia where the ethnic core has 
assimilated ethnic minorities over centuries, these ethnic cores tend to be a clear demographic 
majority and thus usually hold power for long periods of time (as already noted above). 
However, when these ethnic cores are a minority of the population, their hold on power 
tends to be much more tenuous and sporadic.  Losing state power is always traumatic for any 
group, but, due to their history of dominance, members of the ethnic core might have more to lose 
when they fall from power than other groups.  More specifically, there is now a substantial literature 
on ethnic or regional favouritism in Africa26 and more widely,27 which suggests that ethnic groups 
with a co-ethnic in power benefit from greater access to state resources than other ethnic groups, 
with the same logic applying to people who reside in the President’s home region.  These 
privileges can, of course, be revoked once the co-ethnic or co-regional President loses power, and 
thus one proposed mechanism here would be that those who receive patronage resources from 
the state are more likely to identify with the nation. 
However, there could be another more psychological potential mechanism at work here, 
which is built upon the idea that core ethnic groups that have a long history of controlling the state 
might come to consider themselves naturally deserving of their special status, which they would 
feel angry about losing.  This sense of ownership of the state among members of the ethnic core 
and their unhappiness in giving up power fits in well with the two interrelated concepts of loss 
aversion and the endowment effect from behavioural economics, where individuals attach more 
                                               
25 Kaufmann and Haklai 2008. 
26 Ahlerup and Isaksson 2015; Burgess, Jedwab, Miguel, Morjaria, and Padró i Miquel 2015; Franck and 
Rainer 2012; Kramon and Posner 2016. 
27 Hodler and Raschky 2014. 
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importance to losing an object than they do to acquiring it, and more value to maintaining their 
possessions than to acquiring something they do not own, respectively.28  Indeed, there is 
abundant evidence of bitterness among core groups who lose power and therefore turn to ethnic 
and often xenophobic nationalism as a result.  For instance, in the US the election of Barack 
Obama similarly led to resentment among many white Americans about their perceived lost status, 
and fuelled the rise of the Tea Party movement and a revival of white nationalism more generally.29  
From Africa one clear example of this process involves the Akan of Côte d'Ivoire, who held the 
Presidency from 1960 to 1999 and thereby not only reaped numerous political and economic 
privileges but began to develop myths of superiority towards other ethnic groups in the country.30  
Thus, when faced with political pressures from other ethnic groups to give up power in the 1990s, 
various Akan elites developed the xenophobic concept of “Ivoirité” as a mechanism to “preserve 
the position of the Akan in the political arena” (and more specifically to exclude the non-Akan 
politician Alassane Ouattara from power).31 
This evidence leads us to generate four related hypotheses around the relationship 
between the ethnic core and the nation.  First, when the ethnic core is in power, its members 
should identify more with the nation than with their ethnic identity – i.e., have a higher salience for 
their national identity over their ethnic identity – but, when the core group is out of power, these 
members should instead identify more with their ethnic identity rather than the nation.  Second, if 
the psychological mechanism is at work here, then there should be no relationship between 
national identification and either access to public resources or residence in the President’s home 
region as a proxy for access to patronage resources. Third and relatedly, inasmuch as only 
                                               
28 Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990; Tversky and Kahneman 1991. 
29 Zeskind 2012. Cf. Barreto, Cooper, Gonzalez, Parker and Towler (2011, 111) who similarly write that “the 
election of Barack Obama, as the first Black president, and the change it symbolizes, represents a clear 
threat to the social, economic, political and social hegemony to which supporters of the Tea Party had 
become accustomed. More to the point, his ascendance to the White House triggered anxiety, fear, and 
anger among those who support the Tea Party.” 
30 Akindès 2004, 13-15. 
31 Akindès 2004, 28. 
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members of the core group view themselves as synonymous with the nation, we should observe a 
positive relationship between being in power for members of the core ethnic group but not for other 
groups.  Fourth and finally, being out of power for members of core groups should have a larger 
effect on national identification than the effect of being in power.  In order to test these hypotheses 
and examine the causal mechanisms at work I thus turn in the next section to case study evidence 
from Uganda and then in section five to cross-national evidence from Africa. 
 
4. Case Study Evidence from Uganda  
 
One African case study which exemplifies the complicated relationship between ethnic 
cores, national identity and the state are the Baganda, who are the largest ethnic group in Uganda 
but who only comprise some 16-20% of the country’s current total population.  The Baganda are 
members of a kingdom which dates back some 400-600 years, and which originated when one 
Prince broke away from the then dominant Bunyoro-Kitara kingdom centred around the eastern 
shores of Lake Albert, and founded his own kingdom in a core geographical area on the northern 
shores of Lake Victoria.  The Buganda kingdom grew in size and prominence over centuries, to the 
point where it conquered neighbouring peoples and assimilated them as members of Baganda 
clans and the Baganda ethnic group.  One of many examples here are the inhabitants of the 
Buddu and Kooki regions on the western shores of Lake Victoria (north of what is now the 
Ugandan-Tanzanian border), who were conquered in the 19th century and who were fully 
incorporated as Baganda over the past 200 years.32 
When the British arrived in what is now Uganda in the 1870s and 1880s they first 
approached the Kabaka (king) of Buganda, with whom they signed a treaty of agreement; thus the 
British established their colonial capital in Entebbe, close to the Buganda Kingdom capital city of 
Kampala, and named the new Protectorate Uganda, after the Swahili word for Buganda.  The 
British used Baganda agents to help conquer the rest of what was to become Uganda, who 
governed as administrators over various parts of Uganda until the British replaced them with local 
                                               
32 Green 2010, 13-14. 
12 
 
chiefs in the 1920s; moreover, the British copied the multi-tiered system of local government from 
the Buganda kingdom and implanted it across colonial Uganda.  Indeed, this strong influence of 
Buganda over the rest of the country led some historians to talk of Baganda “sub-imperialism” over 
the rest of Uganda,33 which itself led to anti-Buganda sentiments in non-Baganda areas that have 
persisted to the present day.  Nonetheless the colonial period continued to see assimilation of 
ethnic minorities into the Baganda ethnic group within Buganda, in particular some of the 
indigenous Banyoro inhabitants in northern Buganda as well as Banyarwanda immigrants from 
Rwanda.34 
In the 1950s members of the Baganda elite were at the forefront of the anti-colonial 
movement and established the first two nation-wide political parties in Uganda.  The Baganda 
politician Benedicto Kiwanuka led one of these parties to victory in Uganda’s first popular election 
in 1961 and became the country’s first self-governing ruler in the run-up to independence, although 
he lost office the following year in a subsequent election.  Upon independence in 1962 Buganda 
became the only federal state in the country, with other kingdoms given quasi-federal status and 
the rest of the country ruled under a unitary system.  When Uganda was declared a Republic in 
1963, Kabaka Mutesa II became the first President of Uganda, with Milton Obote, a Langi politician 
from northern Uganda, as Prime Minister.  However, in response to accusations of criminal 
involvement in a gold-smuggling plot in 1966, Obote suspended the constitution, assumed the 
Presidency and abolished all kingdoms in Uganda and their federal or semi-federal privileges.  The 
Buganda kingdom government responded to this coup d’etat by effectively declaring independence 
from Uganda, to which Obote responded by storming the Kingdom’s offices and forcing the Kabaka 
into exile. 
The country was then run by Obote and his successor Idi Amin, an army officer from the 
northern Kakwa ethnic group, until Amin was deposed in 1979.  A series of three Baganda 
Presidents then took office between 1979 and 1980, only to see Obote again resume the 
Presidency in December 1980 before he was deposed by an army officer from northern Uganda in 
                                               
33 Roberts 1962. 
34 Green 2008; Richards 1954. 
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1985.  Yoweri Museveni, a member of the Banyankole ethnic group from western Uganda, led a 
rebel army to victory over the Ugandan army in a civil war and became the President in 1986, 
gradually returning the country to a state of calm and stability after some twenty years of chaos 
and conflict.  While popular in Buganda and elsewhere, Museveni nonetheless faced constant 
pressure for the restoration of the Buganda kingdoms, which he finally agreed to in 1993 on the 
provision that it (and the other three restored kingdoms of Bunyoro, Busoga and Toro) would 
abstain from party politics and function as a cultural institution only. 
Over the past thirty years Museveni has attempted to placate the Baganda by over-
representing the Baganda in his cabinet,35 including giving them the posts of Vice-President and 
Prime Minister for a majority of years since 1986.  Despite these efforts there remains large-scale 
dissatisfaction in Buganda over Museveni’s continued stay in power and his failure to return full 
federal autonomy to Buganda (known in the Luganda language as ebyaffe, or “our things”), which 
led to deadly riots in 2009 as well as further clashes in 2010 after the site of the tombs of past 
Kabakas in western Kampala burned down in an act of arson.  In the former case the conflict 
originated in a rural area conquered by Buganda in the 1890s where residents had formerly 
identified as Baganda during colonial rule but who more recently had declared themselves as 
members of the Banyala ethnic group and had protested at attempts by the Buganda kingdom 
government to claim sovereignty over the area.  The Ugandan government halted attempts by the 
Kabaka to visit the Banyala homeland, thereby sparking off anti-Museveni riots in Kampala that left 
several dead and led the government to close the kingdom’s CBS radio station.  The Banyala, 
along with other minority ethnic groups in Buganda formerly considered assimilated like the Baruli 
and the Bakooki,36 have thus been able to assert a non-Baganda ethnic identity largely due to the 
lack of Baganda political control in Kampala. 
Ultimately the source of the tension between Museveni and the Baganda lies in the fact 
that, except for a brief interregnum in 1979-1980, the Baganda have now been out of power in 
Uganda for fifty years despite their history as the country’s core ethnic group.  The Buganda case 
                                               
35 Lindemann 2011. 
36 Until recently the Bakooki and Banyala were considered so obscure that they were not even included on 
the list of 65 indigenous communities of Uganda in the Ugandan Constitution. 
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study highlights the degree to which the causal chain goes from losing power to the declining 
salience of national identity rather than the other way around, given that the first and subsequent 
musings about secession from Uganda only started after the Baganda lost control over the 
presidency in 1966, and that this loss of power had less to do with Baganda commitment to the 
nation than it did with corruption allegations against Milton Obote.  Indeed, the degree to which 
commitment among the Baganda to Ugandan national identity continues to be weaker than their 
commitment to their ethnic identity can be seen in a variety of ways, not the least in various calls 
by numerous Baganda MPs for the kingdom to secede from Uganda in recent years,37 as well as a 
stated desire by numerous expatriate Baganda to only play the Buganda national anthem (and not 
the Ugandan national anthem) at a conference for US-resident Baganda in Boston in 2013.38  
Restoring Buganda’s federal status may dampen the region’s secessionist tendencies, or it may 
increase them, as has happened in Catalonia and Scotland in recent years; but there is no doubt 
that the lack of a Baganda President in power is at the source of much of the ongoing tension 
between Buganda and the Ugandan government.39 
  
5. Data Analysis 
 
5.1. Dataset 
 
 Having examined case study evidence from Uganda, I now turn to quantitative evidence 
from round five of the Afrobarometer survey data, which is the most recent round of the 
Afrobarometer project to have all of its data release to the public.  The survey asked two related 
questions about ethnic and national identity to respondents between late 2011 and early 2013.  In 
the first question it asked respondents for their ethnic identity, whereby respondents could choose 
                                               
37 Walusimbi 2013. 
38 Kiwanuka 2013. 
39 For one of many examples, see a recent statement by one MP, Betty Nambooze, that there needs to be a 
strong candidate from Buganda in the 2021 Presidential elections, inasmuch as in the past the “Buganda 
region has missed out on many opportunities;” Ssekweyama 2016. 
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from a list of ethnic groups but could also refuse to answer or answer “other,” “don’t know,” or that 
he/she only has a national identity and “doesn’t think of oneself in these terms.”  This question was 
asked to respondents in all surveyed countries in this way except Cape Verde, Swaziland and the 
North African countries of Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia. 
 Those who gave an ethnic identity were then asked a subsequent question, namely the 
following: 
 
Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a [Botswanan/Kenyan/etc.] and 
being a [Respondent’s Ethnic Group].  Which of the following best expresses your feelings? 
1 = I feel only [Respondent’s ethnic group] 
2 = I feel more [Respondent’s ethnic group] than [Botswanan/Kenyan/etc.] 
3 = I feel equally [Botswanan/Kenyan/etc.] and [Respondent’s ethnic group] 
4 = I feel more [Botswanan/Kenyan/etc.] than [Respondent’s ethnic group] 
5 = I feel only [Botswanan/Kenyan/etc.] 
 
This question, which is known as the Moreno question after the Spanish political scientist who 
pioneered its use, allows for an accurate assessment of the degree to which individuals identify 
with the nation over their ethnic identity.  Indeed, previous attempts at analysing the strength of 
national identity have instead relied upon such questions as “how proud are you of [nationality]”,40 
which yields no information on how respondents’ rank their ethnic and national identities and thus 
are not suitable for testing my hypothesis here.  In Figure 1 I plot the percentage of respondents in 
each country who gave #4 (more national) or #5 (only national) as their answer to the Moreno 
question, not including the two outliers of Burundi and Tanzania (as discussed below). 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
As regards those respondents who did not give a listed ethnic identity, in round three many 
respondents identified with the “other” category, most notably 44.2% in Tanzania; in rounds four 
and five the addition of more ethnic categories from which respondents could choose from brought 
these numbers down such that the percentage of “others” across the entire dataset dropped from 
4.2% in round three to 1.3% in round five with a high of 13.8% in Cameroon.  The percentages of 
                                               
40 Pehrson, Vignoles, and Brown 2009; Wimmer 2018. 
16 
 
individuals who claimed that they only had a national identity and did not think of themselves in 
ethnic terms was notable only in South Africa (8.3%).  Those who refused to answer the question 
or did not know their ethnic identity were in almost all cases negligible, at 0.2% and 0.7%, 
respectively. 
 Five countries are problematic as regards my analysis.  In Ghana, the Afrobarometer gave 
respondents the option of identifying as Akan rather than sub-groups of the Akan such as the 
Asante and Fante, which are identified as ethnic groups in other sources such as the Soviet Atlas 
Narodov Mira.41  If they are considered a single group then the Akan are certainly the largest 
ethnic group in the county and could be considered the ethnic core of Ghana.  However, it is 
probably more accurate to consider the Fante as the ethnic core given their demographic 
dominance in the core areas of the nineteenth-century colonial state, especially the former colonial 
capital of Cape Coast and subsequent/current capital of Accra.  (In contrast, the capital city of the 
Asante region, Kumasi, remains a provincial city today.)  Due to the lack of any way to identify sub-
Akan groups in the Afrobarometer survey data, I exclude Ghana from my analysis here,42 although 
I do include it in my cross-country panel data results below. 
 In two other countries either the core is not represented in the Afrobarometer sample or 
there is no core ethnic group.  In the former case the Americo-Liberian settlers clearly comprise a 
                                               
41 Bruk 1986. 
42 An obvious question is why I include Cote d’Ivoire in my dataset but exclude Ghana, especially since I 
code the Akan as the core ethnic group of Cote d’Ivoire.  The difference between the two countries is the 
degree to which the Akan function as a single ethnic group.  Indeed, there is a long history of intra-Akan 
fighting in Ghana, specifically between the Asante and the Fante throughout the 19th century.  Thus “the 
Akan category… cannot be considered a meaningful ethnic label [in Ghana] given the intense perception of 
difference – not to mention historical enmity – between the various subsets, especially between the Ashanti 
on one side and the Fante and Akyem on the other;” Nugent (2001, 3).  In contrast, there has been much 
less intra-Akan conflict in the modern history of Cote d’Ivoire, in part because the country is far more divided 
along North/South and Muslim/Christian lines than Ghana (with the Akan identifying with the latter groups in 
both cases), at least since the 1990s.  In any case, the results are robust to excluding Cote d’Ivoire from my 
analysis, as discussed below. 
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core ethnic group in Liberia as regards their association with the state and history of political 
dominance, just as black settlers did across the border in Sierra Leone.  However, perhaps due in 
part to a late-twentieth century move towards assimilating into native ethnic groups after their 
catastrophic loss of power in 1980 – which itself fits into my broader theory about the relationship 
between state power and membership in ethnic cores – the Americo-Liberians are not represented 
in the Afrobarometer dataset.  In the latter case there is no distinct core ethnic group in Lesotho 
because everyone is a member of core Basotho group, and thus there is no variation to examine. 
Finally, the use of the Dfbeta outlier test identified both Burundi and Tanzania as clear 
outliers,43 which is not surprising in either case.  Burundi has the highest average level of national 
identification for round five at 0.87, or 13% higher than the next highest country, Guinea; it also has 
the largest ethnic group as a percentage of the population and the lowest ELF score of any country 
in the sample (Hutus, at 82.4%, and 0.328, respectively).  Along with Rwanda it is also unusual for 
having ethnic groups which are much more akin to caste groups inasmuch as they are not 
territorial in nature,44 a difference which has done much to induce unusually violent ethnic relations 
in both countries in the post-colonial era. 
As regards Tanzania, it has long been considered an outlier in the analysis of national 
identification in Africa, due to the fact that its relatively high levels of national identification cannot 
be explained by the same variables that explain variation elsewhere.  Indeed, the qualitative 
literature on Tanzania has suggested various idiosyncratic factors explaining its cohesive sense of 
national identity, especially the personality of its former President Julius Nyerere.45  It is thus not 
surprising that Robinson identified Tanzania as a statistical outlier as regards country-level 
                                               
43 More specifically, I regressed the country average level of national identification on a variety of country-
level data (as described below for Table 5) and computed the DfBeta scores for each independent variable 
(Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch, 1980).  Burundi’s DfBeta score far exceeds the 2/√n cut-off rule for the ELF 
measure for the ELF variable while Tanzania far exceeds the cut-off for the British colony dummy variable; 
they are also the only two countries to exceed the cut-off for the core ethnic group in power dummy variable. 
44 Vansina 2001. 
45 Collier 2009; Miguel 2004. 
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regressions of national identification on GDP per capita, ethnic diversity and British colonialism 
from Round three of the Afrobarometer.46 
Thus I exclude Burundi, Ghana, Lesotho, Liberia and Tanzania from my analysis, although I 
can include both Ghana and Liberia in my cross-country panel data results below.  The descriptive 
statistics for the dataset are listed in Table A1.3. 
  
5.2. Analysis 
 
To test my hypothesis that state power determines the degree to which ethnic core groups 
identify with the nation or the ethnic group, I use a multi-level hierarchical model with random 
intercepts estimated at the ethnic group and country levels.  The use of this model, rather than an 
OLS model with country-ethnic-group level fixed effects, allows me to control for unchanging 
country-level characteristics such as GDP per capita, ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) and 
British colonialism which have previously been shown to be correlated with national identification.47  
The individual level characteristics included in the model are age, age squared, geodesic distance 
from home region to the capital city (to capture the inability of African states to project their power 
to peripheral areas),48 and dummy variables for education (where 0=those with no secondary 
schooling), gender, urban residence, full-time employment, Muslim identification (to account for a 
potentially decreased attachment to the nation among Muslims),49 and radio ownership, TV 
ownership and access to the internet (with the last three variables controlling for Anderson‘s 
hypothesis about the role of the media in promoting national identification).50  Ethnic group 
variables include the percentage of the population (as computed from the Afrobarometer data 
                                               
46 Robinson 2014. 
47 Masella 2013; Robinson 2014.  The use of an OLS model with country fixed effects and standard errors 
clustered at the country-ethnic group yields similar results (available from author upon request). 
48 Herbst 2000. 
49 Hastings 1997. 
50 Anderson 1991. 
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itself),51 and dummies for partitioned and culturally peripheral groups (as measured by speaking a 
language from a language family different from the ethnic core group).  Finally, state-level controls 
include log of GDP per capita, ELF (as measured by Fearon)52 and a dummy for British 
colonialism.  Of these variables, the only ones that are consistently statistically significant in the 
eleven specifications reported below include gender (male) and log GDP per capita, both of which 
are consistently negative.  The former result corresponds with previous findings from Robinson,53 
while the latter is the exact opposite of her findings (although see section 5.4. below for more on 
this result). 
For my main independent variable I create a dummy variable capturing whether or not an 
ethnic group is a core ethnic group in a given country, and then split the sample into two groups of 
countries: one where the ethnic cores are in power, as determined by the ethnic identity of the 
President, and one where they are not.54  (The coding for all ethnic cores and the Presidents’ 
ethnic identities is spelled out in detail in Appendix two.)  The sample yields thirteen countries with 
the ethnic core in power and nine where it is out of power.  I list all twenty-two countries in Table 1, 
with data on each country’s ethnic core, the President’s ethnic group during the period of the 
survey (if different from the ethnic core), the largest ethnic group (if different from the ethnic core), 
and whether or not the country was included in Afrobarometer Round four.  If my hypothesis is 
correct, we should observe a positive and statistically significant correlation between ethnic core 
membership and national identification for countries where the ethnic core is in power, and a 
                                               
51 I use the Afrobarometer data to measure the ethnic group percentages rather than Fearon (2003) since 
many of the ethnic groups listed in the Afrobarometer are not listed by Fearon (2003).  For instance, Fearon 
(2003) lists 9 ethnic groups in Cameroon compared to 45 in the Afrobarometer. 
52 Fearon 2003.  The results do not change if I instead use alternative measures of ELF or follow Robinson 
(2014) and control for the size of the largest ethnic group per country. 
53 Robinson 2014. 
54 Of course, many ethnic groups such as the Akan, Hausa and Ovambo are present in large numbers 
across multiple countries.  This issue does not cause a problem for my analysis since ethnic cores are coded 
at the country level, meaning that Hausa in Niger are considered members of an ethnic core but Hausa in 
Nigeria are not. 
20 
 
negative and statistically significant correlation for countries where the ethnic core is out of power.  
The basic models thus take the form: 
 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + β1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑾𝑾𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝛽𝛽0𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾00𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾01𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺0𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛾𝛾02𝑖𝑖𝑿𝑿𝟎𝟎𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝐶𝐶0𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝛾𝛾00𝑖𝑖 = 𝜃𝜃000 + 𝜃𝜃00𝑖𝑖𝒁𝒁𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝒊𝒊 +  𝐺𝐺00𝑖𝑖 
 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the individual-level indicator of national over ethnic identification for individual i in 
ethnic group j in country k, with 𝑾𝑾𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 representing a vector of individual-level controls and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 the 
individual-level error term.  The second equation models the individual-level intercept as a function 
of country-ethnic group characteristics, including the key independent dummy variable 
𝛾𝛾01𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺0𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, which captures whether or not ethnic group j is a core ethnic group in 
country k, as well as 𝑿𝑿𝟎𝟎𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊, a vector of ethnic-group level controls, and 𝐶𝐶0𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, the ethnic-group level 
error term.  Finally, the third equation models the country-ethnic-group level intercept as a function 
of 𝒁𝒁𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝒊𝒊, a vector of country-level controls, and 𝐺𝐺00𝑖𝑖, the country-level error term. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
In Table 2 I list my initial results.  First in column one I include the entire dataset, where the 
coefficient on the core ethnic group is not statistically significant but membership in the same 
ethnic group as the President is positive and statistically significant.  Next, in columns two and 
three I split the sample, first for countries where the core group is in power and second for those 
where they are out of power.  As expected, the coefficient for the core ethnic group in column two 
is positive while the coefficient in column three is negative, and in both cases they are statistically 
significant at the 5% level.  Moreover, the coefficient on the co-ethnic President variable is negative 
and not significant in column three. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
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It is possible that what I am actually capturing here is a demographic relationship between 
the largest ethnic group and the state, such that members of the largest ethnic group consider 
themselves to be the dominant group based on their numbers.55  As such I replace the core ethnic 
group dummy variable with a dummy capturing whether or not the respondent is a member of the 
largest ethnic group in the country, while splitting the sample into countries where the largest 
ethnic group is either in power or not.  This change means that two countries, namely Botswana 
and Guinea, now shift from the left column (ethnic group in power) to the right column (ethnic 
group out of power).  The result, as seen in columns four and five, is that the coefficient on the 
largest ethnic group dummy is not statistically significant in either column, and suggests that my 
results are not just driven by ethnic demography. 
Finally, in columns six and seven I control for access to patronage resources, measured 
indirectly by whether or not an individual resides in the President’s home region, and directly by a 
variety of measures of access to public goods, such as access to electricity or a piped or sewage 
water system, whether there is a post office, school, police station and health clinic within walking 
distance of the respondent’s residence, and whether local roads in the area are paved or not.  
These controls allow me to test for the possibility that it is access to patronage resources that 
explain higher levels of national identification among core ethnic groups in power rather than the 
alternative psychological mechanism proposed in section three above.  Yet the none of the 
coefficients on the co-regional President variable and the measures of access to public goods are 
consistently statistically significant across the two specifications, and the coefficient on the core 
ethnic group variable remains statistically significant. 
The results in Table 2 confirm all four hypotheses mentioned in section three.  First, the 
sign of the coefficient on the core ethnic group switches depending whether or not the core group 
is in power.  Second, the lack of any statistically significant relationship between national 
identification and either the co-regional President variable or the public goods variables suggests 
that access to patronage resources is not driving the greater sense of national identification among 
                                               
55 O'Leary 2001. 
22 
 
members of the core ethnic group when they are in power.  Third, the coefficient on the co-ethnic 
President variable is never statistically significant in columns three, five and seven, indicating that 
being in power does not necessarily promote greater national identification for non-core groups.  
Finally, the size of the core ethnic group coefficient is always larger in absolute magnitude when 
the groups are out of power, which indicates the degree to which being out of power has a stronger 
effect than being in power and provides additional support for the psychological mechanism.56   
 In Table 3 I list two further robustness tests.  First, in columns one and two I change the 
dependent variable to the original five-point scale described in section three above, with no 
changes in my results.  (The results are also robust to using only national identification [answer #5 
in section three above] as a dependent variable, with results available from the author.)  Second, in 
columns three and four I add additional country-level controls to account for various characteristics 
that could have influenced inter-ethnic relations and national identification, namely historical slave 
exports, absolute latitude and geographical size, all of which have been shown elsewhere to be 
correlated with levels of ethnic fractionalization in Africa (which leads me to drop ELF as a control 
variable here).57  I then also control for the length of colonial rule as well as the length of time since 
independence, both of which may be correlated with the degree to which intermarriage and state 
policies may have promoted both assimilation and/or nation-building.  None of these additional 
controls are consistently statistically significant across the two columns. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
5.3. Additional Empirical Results 
 
For additional robustness I also examine a variety of sub-samples.  As reported in 
Appendix Table A1.1, I first examine sub-samples that eliminate countries with notable Asian 
settler communities (Kenya, Mozambique, South Africa and Uganda) and countries with white 
                                               
56 Interestingly, the core ethnic group coefficient is around twice as large for groups out of power than when 
in power, which is the same ratio between loss and gain value found by Tversky and Kahneman (1991). 
57 Green 2013. 
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settlers (Botswana, Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe), on the 
grounds that the dynamics of national identification might have been affected by such the presence 
of non-African settlers.  In none of these sub-samples are the results different.  In Table A1.2 I list 
results at each individual country level; here I use pooled OLS with robust standard errors 
clustered at the ethnic group level inasmuch as multilevel models lose accuracy at their highest 
level when that number becomes too small and the highest level when running individual country 
regressions is the ethnic group level, which is the level at which the key core ethnic group variable 
is located.58  In both cases the sign is correct for a majority of countries in the sample and 
statistically significant in a fair number as well.  (However, the results should be taken with a large 
grain of salt as the ethnic group clusters are small in number and highly unbalanced.)59 
Recent research suggests that public opinion surveys conducted in developing (non-
OECD) countries are at risk of significant amounts of duplication and thus could potentially yield 
biased and inaccurate results.60  One way to tackle this problem here is to test my hypothesis with 
an alternative dataset, specifically data from the previous Afrobarometer round four.  This round 
was conducted between 2008 and 2009 in twenty countries, specifically all of those countries from 
round five minus Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mauritius, Niger, Sierra Leone and Togo.  
Using data from round four provides an excellent way to test the robustness of my results above, 
since this smaller subset eliminates the two countries with the highest level of national identification 
in round five, namely Guinea and Niger, and includes three countries whose core ethnic group 
either lost power subsequent to round five (the Wolof of Senegal) or gained power (the Bambara in 
Mali and the Bemba in Zambia).61  However, it is also less representative of Sub-Saharan Africa as 
a whole inasmuch as it, like round three, oversamples former British colonies.62 
                                               
58 Maas and Hox 2005. 
59 I also eliminated countries one at a time on the basis that my results may be heavily influenced by one 
country; the results (which are available upon request) do not notably change. 
60 Kuriakose and Robbins 2016. 
61 We cannot use data from round three as the numbers are even further reduced from round four to a total 
of only eleven countries, of which there are five with the core ethnic group in power and six where it is out of 
power. 
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Table 4 presents the results from round four, first for the core ethnic groups in columns one 
and two and then again for the largest ethnic group per country in columns three and four.  The 
results are almost identical to those from round five as regards the signs and size of the coefficient 
on the core ethnic group.  The only notable differences from Table 3 is that the coefficient on the 
core ethnic group has lost a bit of statistical significance (p = 0.061) in column two, while the 
coefficient on the president’s ethnic group is now positive and statistically significant in columns 
two and four and the coefficient on the largest group is positive and statistically significant in 
column three, which in all cases may be a consequence of the smaller sample size. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
5.4. Country-Round Results 
 
 In my final set of results I turn instead to country-round observations, where I regress the 
average level of national identification per country-round on a dummy variable capturing whether or 
not the country’s core ethnic group was in power at the time along with a number of co-variates 
and time dummies for each round.  Here I use a pooled OLS model with clustered standard errors 
rather than a fixed-effect model, since the number of observations per country is small, there is 
very little within-country variation over time in the main independent variable due to the short-time 
span involved, and doing so allows me to include time-invariant controls such as a former British 
colony dummy.63  By estimating the results by country-round I can now include countries like 
Ghana and Liberia which I had previously excluded due to either a lack of respondents identifying 
with the core ethnic group or problems in coding the core ethnic group, since here the key 
                                                                                                                                                           
62 I performed a simple logit analysis whereby I regressed inclusion in the Afrobarometer survey on a number 
of covariates such as British and Portuguese colonial dummies, GDP per capita, ELF and a set of 
geographical variables.  The coefficient on the British colonial dummy was positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level for rounds three and four but not for round five; none of the other variables were 
statistically significant.  These results are available from the author upon request. 
63 Clark and Linzer 2015.  The results are almost identical when using a random-effects model. 
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independent variable is simply whether or not the key ethnic group is in power.  I can also include 
the Afrobarometer round six results which, at the time of writing, were available online at the 
country level only. (Round six includes exactly the same number of countries as round five.)  In my 
analysis I add controls such as log GDP/capita, a former British colony dummy and each country’s 
ELF score, as well as round fixed effects.64  I also include each country’s Polity2 score to account 
for the possibility that democratization could be correlated with the ethnic core’s hold on power in 
the majority of African countries where the core group is not an absolute majority.  The sample is, 
however, problematic in that the panel is unbalanced, with fourteen countries in round three, 
seventeen in round four and twenty-four in both rounds five and six.  I thus create a perfectly 
balanced panel for rounds five and six with twenty-four countries, rounds four through six with 
seventeen countries and rounds three through six with fourteen countries as additional robustness 
checks.65  The model thus takes the following form: 
 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 + β1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 + β2𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 +  β3𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 +  β4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 +  β5𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛𝐵𝐵ℎ𝑖𝑖+  β6𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑘 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 
 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘  is the proportion of people identifying with the nation over the ethnic group in country k in 
round t, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 is the core ethnic group in power dummy variable for 
country k at time t, 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 and 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 capture log GDP per capita and Polity2 scores for country 
k at time t, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 and 𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛𝐵𝐵ℎ𝑖𝑖 are time-invariant variables measuring ELF and British colonialism, 
respectively, 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑘 is the round fixed-effect variable and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 is the error term. 
In Table 5 I regress national identification on the core ethnic group in power variable along 
with the aforementioned covariates.  Column one lists the main results, while column two uses a 
balanced dataset from rounds five and six, column three a balanced dataset from rounds four 
through six and column four a balanced dataset from rounds three through six.  The results clearly 
                                               
64 Additional country-level covariates such as those included in Tables 2 and 3 make no difference to the 
results. 
65 The results do not differ if I instead use the 5-point national identification scale as an alternative dependent 
variable; results available from the author. 
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show that having a core ethnic group in power adds around 12% on average to the percentage of 
people identifying with the nation over the ethnic group.  To put this result in another way, across 
the four columns the core ethnic group dummy is almost identical to the former British colony 
dummy variable but with the opposite sign, which suggests that having a core ethnic group in 
power effectively cancels out the negative effect of British colonialism on national identification in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  Moreover, none of the other covariates are consistently statistically significant 
at the 5% level, including the log GDP per capita coefficient which was negative and significant for 
the round five results listed above.66 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
 In this paper I examined the relationship between core or dominant ethnic groups and 
national identity, and argued that there should exist a positive relationship between ethnic cores 
and national identification when members of ethnic cores held power, and a negative one when 
they were out of power.  I then used qualitative evidence from Uganda as well as quantitative 
evidence from the Afrobarometer project to show strong evidence for this hypothesis, as well as 
evidence that the mechanism more psychological than anything to do with access to patronage 
resources.  Finally, through the use of panel data from several rounds of the Afrobarometer I 
showed that having an ethnic core in power added an average of 12% to the number of people 
who identified with the nation rather than their ethnic group, thereby effectively cancelling out the 
negative effect of British colonialism on national identification. 
                                               
66 It is still possible that there is a potential that reverse causality may play a role here, inasmuch as 
increasing/decreasing levels of national identification could lead an ethnic core group to maintain/lose power, 
which is not something that the data lends itself to examining.  However, the qualitative evidence from 
Uganda does suggest that causal chain is from losing power to declining national identification, rather than 
the other way around. 
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 There are several implications I can take from my analysis.  First, my argument should not 
apply just to Africa but also other parts of the world where ethnic cores either come into power or 
fall out of power.  I have already mentioned the rise of white nationalism in the US as a result of the 
(perceived) loss of power of the white American ethnic core group; my results could also help to 
explain conflicts and violence that result from the loss of power of ethnic core groups in the Middle 
East, whether recently in such countries as Iraq (with Sunni Arabs as the core ethnic group) or in 
the future if and when the Gulf countries were ever to extend the franchise to the vast majority of 
their residents who are immigrants.  One could even extend this analysis to issues around gender 
and politics, such that men might see themselves as the dominant political gender and, upon losing 
power, choose to retreat into sexism rather than promote gender-neutral policies. 
 Second, my analysis has important implications for African politics.  Previous research has 
examined the various attempts by African leaders to pursue numerous kinds of nation-building 
policies, especially in attempts to downgrade ethnic identities in favour of national ones.67  Yet one 
way to interpret my analysis here is to suggest that such attempts are fruitless at incorporating the 
core ethnic group unless it holds executive power, which corresponds to Bandyopadhyay and 
Green’s findings that nation-building policies in modern Africa have had no real effect in preventing 
civil conflict.68 
Third, further research could examine the degree to which the relationship between ethnic 
exclusion and conflict is actually dependent on whether or not the ethnic core is excluded from 
power.  Indeed, in their ethnic-group level analysis of the origins of ethno-nationalist conflicts, 
Cederman, Wimmer, and Min show not only that exclusion from power is a robust predictor of 
conflict but so too is group size and having lost power.69  The two latter variables clearly relate to 
ethnic cores inasmuch as they tend to be the largest group in the country and have a long history, 
at least in Africa, of losing power to other groups in countries where they are not the majority.  In 
fact, one could even connect my argument to the correlation between a history of losing power and 
conflict for non-core ethnic groups, inasmuch as countries with dominant cores which do not 
                                               
67 Bandyopadhyay and Green 2013. 
68 Bandyopadhyay and Green 2013. 
69 Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010. 
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consistently hold power therefore allow minority groups to seize power sporadically for short 
periods of time.  The aforementioned example of Uganda fits perfectly into this narrative: the 
origins of the Lord’s Resistance Army rebellion derive in large part from the Acholi loss of status 
after President Museveni defeated the then government of Tito Okello in 1986.  If, however, the 
Baganda had remained politically dominant beyond 1966, it is possible that no Acholi President 
would have come to power and thus there would not have been any loss of status for the Acholi to 
channel into a rebellion. 
Finally, I would hope that the results of this paper would spur further research into the roles 
of ethnic cores in modern nations.  Detailed analyses in the literature on the role of ethnic cores in 
the historical foundation of modern nations have not been met by a similar analysis of the role and 
place of ethnic cores in the contemporary world, whether in Africa or elsewhere.  Certainly more 
qualitative and quantitative work could be done on this subject in the future. 
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Figure 1: Proportion choosing National over Ethnic identification by Country 
(Source: Afrobarometer Data Round 5) 
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Table 1: Countries and Ethnic Cores included in Afrobarometer, Round 5 
 
Country Ethnic Core President’s ethnic group during Largest ethnic group Afrobarometer Round 4 data 
  survey (if different from ethnic core) (if different from ethnic core) 
Benin Fon Yoruba  X 
Botswana Bangwato  Bakalanga X 
Burkina Faso Mossi   X 
Cameroon Beti-Pahuin    
Cote d’Ivoire Akan Mande du Nord/Malinké   
Guinea Malinké  Peulh  
Kenya Kikuyu   X 
Madagascar Merina   X 
Malawi Chewa Yao  X 
Mali Bambara   X 
Mauritius Hindu    
Mozambique Makua Ronga/Sena  X 
Namibia Ovambo   X 
Niger Haoussa    
Nigeria Yoruba Ijaw Hausa X 
Senegal Wolof Fula/Pulaar  X 
Sierra Leone Creole Temne Mende70  
South Africa Blacks   X 
Togo Ewé Kabye   
Uganda Baganda Banyankole  X 
Zambia Bemba   X 
Zimbabwe Shona   X 
 
                                               
70 Alesina, Devleeshauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003) list the Temne (30%) as the largest group in Sierra Leone over the Mende (29%) but the 
Afrobarometer, Bruk (1986) and Fearon (2003) all list the Mende as the largest group. 
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Table 2: Ethnicity and National Identity, Main Results 
(Dependent Variable: National > Ethnic Identity) 
 
Sample Full Pres Group Pres Group Pres Group Pres Group Pres Group Pres Group 
   = Core Group ≠ Core Group = Largest Group ≠ Largest Group = Core Group ≠ Core Group 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Core Ethnic Group 0.004 0.082** -0.149***   0.078** -0.152*** 
  (0.029) (0.036) (0.052)   (0.036) (0.051) 
President’s Ethnic Group 0.051*  -0.017  0.018  -0.014 
  (0.028)  (0.037)  (0.035)  (0.036) 
Largest Ethnic Group    0.033 -0.068 
     (0.040)  (0.055) 
President’s Region      -0.002 -0.015 
       (0.012) (0.014) 
 
Constant 0.824*** 0.811*** 2.324*** 0.640*** 2.417*** 0.812*** 2.371*** 
  (0.305) (0.311) (0.304) (0.308) (0.304) (0.309) (0.328) 
Country-level intercepts 0.017 0.011 0.002 0.010 0.003 0.011 0.002 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) 
Ethnic Group-level 0.010 0.011 0.008 0.012 0.008 0.010 0.008 
 Intercepts (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Individual, ethnic group yes yes yes yes yes yes yes  
 and country controls 
Controls for access to no no no no no yes yes 
 public goods 
Country-level 22 13 9 11 11 13 9 
 observations 
Ethnic Group-level  441 266 175 230 211 266 175 
 Observations  
Individual-level 32,205 17,991 14,214 15,764 16,441 17,991 14,214 
 Observations  
 
* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01.  Individual-level control variables include age, age squared, log of distance to capital city and dummies for 
education, gender, urban residence, Muslim, radio ownership, t.v. ownership, access to the internet and full-time employment.  Ethnic-group level 
control variables include percentage of total population and dummies for partitioned and peripheral groups.  State-level controls include log of GDP 
per capita, ELF and a dummy for former British colonies.  Controls for public goods in columns six and seven include dummies representing access to 
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electricity, piped water and a sewage system; proximity to a post office, school, police station and health clinic; and whether the nearby roads are 
paved or not. 
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Table 3: Ethnicity and National Identity, Additional Results 
 
Dependent Variable 5-point scale 5-point scale National>Ethnic National>Ethnic 
 
Sample Pres Group Pres Group Pres Group Pres Group 
  = Core Group ≠ Core Group = Core Group ≠ Core Group 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Core Ethnic Group 0.274*** -0.338*** 0.073** -0.143***  
  (0.083) (0.127)  (0.036) (0.052)  
President’s Ethnic Group  -0.039  -0.013  
   (0.091)  (0.037)  
 
Constant 4.090*** 8.228*** -0.263 5.025***  
  (0.603) (0.496)  (0.422) (1.703)  
Country-level intercepts 0.039 0.002 0.004 0.000 
  (0.018) (0.004) (0.002) (0.000) 
Ethnic Group-level 0.057 0.052 0.011 0.008 
 Intercepts (0.010) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) 
Additional country-level no no yes yes 
 controls  
Individual, ethnic group yes yes yes yes  
 and country controls 
Country-level 13 9 13 9 
 observations 
Ethnic Group-level  266 175 266 175 
 observations 
Individual-level 17,991 14,214 17,991 14,214 
 observations 
 
* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01.  Individual-level control variables include age, age squared, log 
of distance to capital city and dummies for education, gender, urban residence, Muslim, radio 
ownership, t.v. ownership, access to the internet and full-time employment.  Ethnic-group level 
control variables include percentage of total population and dummies for partitioned and peripheral 
groups.  State-level controls include log of GDP per capita, ELF and a dummy for former British 
colonies.  Additional country-level controls included in columns three and four include log of slave 
exports, log of absolute latitude, log of geographical size in kilometers squared, log of the length of 
colonization in years and log of the number of years since independence. 
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Table 4: Ethnicity and National Identity, Afrobarometer Round 4 
(Dependent Variable: National > Ethnic Identity) 
 
Sample Pres Group Pres Group Largest Group Largest Group 
  = Core Group ≠ Core Group = Core Group ≠ Core Group 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Core Ethnic Group 0.128*** -0.157*    
  (0.038) (0.084) 
President’s Ethnic Group  0.146***  0.137*** 
   (0.043)  (0.051) 
Largest Ethnic Group   0.136*** 0.035 
    (0.045) (0.079) 
 
Constant 0.256 1.494*** 0.391 1.445*** 
  (0.215) (0.294) (0.217) (0.359) 
Country-level intercepts 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.003 
  (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
Ethnic Group-level 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.010 
 Intercepts (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Individual, ethnic group yes yes yes yes  
 and country controls 
Country-level 8 7 8 7 
 observations 
Ethnic Group-level  147 158 143 162 
 observations 
Individual-level 10,095 10,112 10,162 10,045 
 observations 
 
* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01.  Individual-level control variables include age, age squared and 
dummies for education, gender, urban residence, Muslim, radio ownership, t.v. ownership and full-
time employment.  Ethnic-group level control variables include percentage of total population and 
dummies for partitioned and peripheral groups.  State-level controls include log of GDP per capita, 
ELF and a dummy for former British colonies. 
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Table 5: Ethnicity and National Identity, Country-Level Panel Data 
(Dependent Variable National>Ethnic) 
 
Rounds 3-6 5-6 only 4-6 only 3-6 
  (unbalanced) (balanced) (balanced) (balanced) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Core Ethnic Group 0.123*** 0.148*** 0.140*** 0.077*** 
 In Power (0.030) (0.040) (0.035) (0.022) 
Former British Colony -0.120*** -0.106** -0.083* -0.170*** 
  (0.036) (0.049) (0.043) (0.032) 
ELF 0.106 0.097 0.073 0.415*** 
  (0.134) (0.195) (0.177) (0.058) 
Log GDP/capita -0.019 -0.062** -0.042 0.014 
  (0.024) (0.029) (0.032) (0.023) 
Polity2 0.005 0.006 0.013** 0.017*** 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
 
Constant 0.535*** 0.807*** 0.615*** 0.030 
  (0.220) (0.266) (0.258) (0.179) 
 
Round fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
 
Countries 25 24 17 14 
 
Observations 80 48 51 56 
 
R2  0.368 0.399 0.358 0.545 
 
* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01.  Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. 
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Appendix 1: Additional Results 
 
Table A1.1: Ethnicity and National Identity, Additional Results 
 (Dependent Variable: National > Ethnic Identity) 
 
Sample Pres Group Pres Group Pres Group Pres Group 
  = Core Group ≠ Core Group = Core Group ≠ Core Group 
 
Region w/o Asian w/o Asian w/o White w/o White 
  Settler Settler Settler Settler 
  Countries Countries Countries Countries  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  
   
Core Ethnic Group 0.096** -0.124** 0.147* -0.149***  
  (0.047) (0.054) (0.086) (0.052)  
President’s Ethnic Group  -0.064  -0.017  
   (0.040)  (0.037)  
 
Constant 1.295*** 2.245*** 4.408*** 2.324***  
  (0.280) (0.320) (0.682) (0.304)  
Country-level intercepts 0.006 0.002 0.000 0.002 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) 
Ethnic Group-level 0.011 0.006 0.016 0.008 
 Intercepts (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
 
Individual, ethnic group yes yes yes yes  
 and country controls 
 
Country-level observations 11 7 6 9  
 
Ethnic Group-level 229 121 125 175  
 observations 
Individual-level observations 13,558 9,924 6,582 14,214  
 
* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01.  Individual-level control variables include age, age squared, log 
of distance to capital city and dummies for education, gender, urban residence, Muslim, radio 
ownership, t.v. ownership, access to the internet and full-time employment.  Ethnic-group level 
control variables include percentage of total population and dummies for partitioned and peripheral 
groups.  State-level controls include log of GDP per capita, ELF and a dummy for former British 
colonies. 
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Table A1.2: Ethnicity and National Identity, 
Additional Results For Countries One at a Time 
 (Dependent Variable: National > Ethnic Identity) 
 
Sample Pres Group Pres Group 
  = Core Group ≠ Core Group 
 
 Botswana 0.074*** -0.067  Benin  
  (0.009) (0.348) 
 
 Burkina Faso -0.070 -0.049  Cote d’Ivoire 
  (0.535) (0.050) 
 
 Cameroon 0.115*** -0.011  Malawi  
  (0.026) (0.105) 
 
 Guinea 0.250*** -0.218  Mozambique 
  (0.018) (0.145) 
 
 Kenya -0.018 -0.065  Nigeria 
  (0.030) (0.052) 
 
 Madagascar 0.130* 0.007  Senegal 
  (0.063) (0.106) 
 
 Mali 0.208* -0.095**  Sierra Leone 
  (0.115) (0.037) 
 
 Mauritius -0.035 0.118  Togo 
  (0.039) (0.144) 
 
 Namibia -0.429 -0.226**  Uganda 
  (0.252) (0.094) 
 
 Niger 0.158  
  (0.091)  
 
 South Africa -0.018 
  (0.042) 
 
 Zambia 0.750** 
  (0.291) 
 
 Zimbabwe 0.489 
  (0.371) 
 
* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01.  Individual-level control variables include age, age squared, log 
of distance to capital city and dummies for education, gender, urban residence, Muslim, radio 
ownership, t.v. ownership, access to the internet and full-time employment.  Ethnic-group level 
control variables include percentage of total population and dummies for partitioned and peripheral 
groups.  These regressions are estimated using pooled OLS and robust standard errors clustered 
at the ethnic group level. 
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Table A1.3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Obs. Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
 
National>Ethnic 34,008 0.473 0.499 0 1  
Core Ethnic Group Membership 34,794 0.344 0.475 0 1 
Peripheral Ethnic Group Membership 34,794 0.078 0.268 0 1 
Ethnic Group percentage 34,794 0.191 0.169 0.0004 0.625 
Partitioned Ethnic Group 34,794 0.358 0.479 0 1 
Urbanization  34,794 0.360 0.480 0 1 
Age  34,794 36.738 14.355 18 105 
Age squared  34,794 1555.739 1273.21 324 11,025 
Gender (0=male, 1=female) 34,794 0.500 0.500 0 1 
Muslim  34,794 0.273 0.446 0 1 
Owns Radio   34,794 0.704 0.457 0 1 
Owns TV  34,794 0.407 0.491 0 1 
No Internet Access 33,947 0.817 0.387 0 1 
Full Time Employment 34,665 0.206 0.404 0 1 
Education  34,794 0.500 0.500 0 9 
Log distance from Capital City (in km) 34,794 4.604 2.169 0 7.415 
Former British Colony 34,794 0.621 0.485 0 1 
Log GDP per capita 34,794 7.039 1.005 5.599 9.118 
ELF (Fearon)  34,794 0.744 0.155 0.351 0.930 
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Appendix 2: Coding Ethnic Cores and the President’s Ethnic Group by Country 
 
Part A: Afrobarometer Round 5 
 
Below I detail coding decisions for all countries in the dataset for both the core ethnic group and 
the President’s ethnic group.  For the former I use various sources, including data on ethnic 
demography from the Afrobarometer as well as the Soviet 1985 ethnographic atlas by Bruk (1986) 
and two more recent datasets on ethnic diversity by country by Alesina, Devleeshauwer, Easterly, 
Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003) and Fearon (2003). 
 
Benin 
 
Core Ethnic Group 
 
The core ethnic group in Benin is the Fon, which is the largest ethnic group in the country 
according to the Afrobarometer (41.9%), Alesina et al. (39.7%), Bruk (65.6%) and Fearon (55.5%).  
The Fon were the core ethnic group of the Dahomey Empire, which was conquered by the French 
in 1894 and which gave its name to the colony of French Dahomey and the Republic of Dahomey 
until the country was renamed Benin in 1975 in order to make its name more ethnically neutral.  
(Ironically, the coastline of the Bight of Benin from which the country’s second name comes is also 
located within the Fon traditional homeland.)  The Beninese army corps was historically dominated 
by Fon, including Major Jean-Baptiste Hachème (President 18-19 December 1967); other notable 
Fon politicians include Justin Ahomadégbé-Tomêtin (Prime Minister 1964-1965 and President 
May-October 1972), Nicéphore Soglo (President 1991-1996) and Patrice Talon (President April 
2016 – present). 
 
President’s Ethnic Group 
 
Thomas Boni Yayi was President of Benin between 6 April 2006 and 6 April 2016, and is a 
member of the Yoruba ethnic group. 
 
 
Botswana 
 
Core Ethnic Group 
 
The core ethnic group in Botswana is the Bangwato, who comprise 12.3% of the population and 
are thus the largest sub-group of the Tswana people and the second largest ethnic group in 
Botswana after the Kalanga (15.2%).  (Alesina et al., Bruk and Fearon all list the Tswana as a 
single group.)  Prominent Bangwato politicians include Seretse Khama (President 1966-1980), Ian 
Khama (Vice-President 1998-2008 and President 2008-present) and Lenyeletse Seretse (Vice-
President 1980-1983).  The Bangwato have long been the dominant sub-group of the Tswana 
people, indicated by the name given to their home province, Central District, which is the largest 
district in Botswana by both area and population.  Seretse Khama’s grandfather, Khama III, was 
one of three chiefs who travelled to the UK in 1895 in order to convince Queen Victoria to not allow 
what would become Botswana to be absorbed into Cecil Rhodes’ Cape Colony.  The ruling 
Botswana Democratic Party has long been seen as dominated by the Bangwato. 
 
President’s Ethnic Group 
 
Ian Khama has been President of Botswana since 1 April 2008; he is from the Bangwato ethnic 
group. 
 
 
Burkina Faso 
 
Core Ethnic Group 
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The core ethnic group in Burkina Faso is the Mossi, who comprise the largest ethnic group in 
Burkina Faso according to the Afrobarometer (52.8%), Alesina et al. (47.9%), Bruk (48.0%) and 
Fearon (50%).  The capital of the Mossi Empire from the 15th century was Ouagadougou, which 
the French created as the capital of their new colony of Upper Volta in 1919.  For a majority of 
years since independence Burkina Faso has been led by Mossi Presidents, including the first 
independent leader of Upper Volta, Maurice Yaméogo (1960-1966); Thomas Sankara (of both 
Mossi and Fulani descent; 1983-1987), who changed the name of the country to Burkina Faso, 
which means “the land of upright people” in the Mossi language; and Blaise Compaoré (1987-
2014).  Despite Sankara’s Mossi heritage, his attempts to confine the activities of the Moro Naba, 
the Mossi chief, led in part to his downfall and execution (Wilkins, 1989). 
 
President’s Ethnic Group 
 
Blaise Compaoré was President between 1987 and 2014, and is a member of the Mossi ethic 
group. 
 
 
Cameroon 
 
Core Ethnic Group 
 
The core ethnic group in Cameroon is the Beti-Pahuin, who originate in the southern tropical region 
and who comprise the second-largest ethnic group in the country according to Afrobarometer 
(14.2%) after the Bamileke but the largest according to Fearon (18%) as well as Alesina et al. 
(19.6%) and Bruk (19.6%), where they are identified by one of their sub-groups, the Fang.1  The 
capital city of Yaoundé was named after the local Yaunde people, who are a sub-group of the Beti-
Pahuin, The Beti-Pahuin have held the presidency for a majority of years since independence 
through Paul Biya, who took power from Ahmadou Ahidjo in 1982 and who has consistently 
favoured the Beti-Pahuin group through his policies over the past three decades (Konings and 
Nyamnjoh, 1997, p. 213). 
 
President’s Ethnic Group 
 
Paul Biya has been President of Cameroon since 6 November 1982, and is a member of the Beti-
Pahuin ethnic group. 
 
 
Côte d'Ivoire 
 
Core Ethnic Group 
 
The core ethnic group in Côte d'Ivoire is the Akan, which is the largest group in the country 
according to the Afrobarometer (38.2%) as well as Alesina et al. (24%), Bruk (27.5%) and Fearon 
(35.0%) if one adds together the Baoulé, Agni and Ebrié/Lagoon Akan sub-groups.  The former 
capital city of Abidjan as well as the current capital of Yamoussoukro both lie within the Akan-
dominated south.  Côte d'Ivoire has been ruled for a majority of years since independence by 
members of the Akan, specifically Felix Houphouët-Boigny (1960-1993) and Henri Konan Bédié 
(1993-1999), and as such the Akan dominated other groups both politically and economically in the 
late 20th century (Langer, 2005).  Indeed, there is evidence that Houphouët-Boigny encouraged the 
Akan to believe in themselves as superior to other ethnic groups in the country, such that they 
were more “civilized” than other groups and were thus the “ideal political class of the Ivoirian 
nation” (Akindès, 2004, p. 14). 
 
                                               
1 The Afrobarometer lists 13.8% of Cameroonian respondents under “Other” for ethnic identity, many of 
whom could have given one of the Beti-Pahuin sub-groups as their identity. 
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President’s Ethnic Group 
 
Alassane Outtara has been President of Côte d'Ivoire since 4 December 2010, and is a member of 
the Mandinka/Malinke ethnic group, which is identified more commonly in Côte d'Ivoire as part of 
the Northern Mandé group (or Mandé du Nord in French). 
 
 
Guinea 
 
Core Ethnic Group 
 
The core ethnic group in Guinea is the Mandinka/Malinke, who comprise the second-largest ethnic 
group in the country according to the Afrobarometer (27.7%), Alesina et al. (25.8%) and Bruk 
(23.2%) after the Fula/Peulh.2  The Mandinka were the founders of the Mali/Mandeng Empire, 
which comprises much of modern-day Guinea, and thus see themselves as having particular 
“claims to Guinea by virtue of their participation in the building of the ancient Mandeng Kindgom” 
(Groelsema, 1998, p. 418).  The country has been ruled for a majority of years since independence 
by Mandinka politicians, namely Ahmed Sékou Touré (President 1958-1984), Sékouba Konaté 
(President 2009-2010) and Alpha Condé (President 2010 – present).  As such the country 
experienced a “Malinkaization” of the public sector after independence through the 1980s, at the 
expense of other ethnic groups such as the Peulh (Groelsema, 1998, p. 416). 
 
President’s Ethnic Group 
 
Alpha Condé has been President since 21 December 2010 and is a member of the 
Mandinka/Malinke ethnic group. 
 
 
Kenya 
 
Core Ethnic Group 
 
The core ethnic group in Kenya is the Kikuyu, who comprise the largest ethnic group in the country 
according to the Afrobarometer (20.0%), Alesina et al. (22%) and Bruk (21.1%).3  The country 
takes its name from Mt. Kenya, whose southern slopes are located in the Kikuyu homeland.  
Prominent Kikuyu include Jomo Kenyatta (President 1963-1978), Mwai Kibaki (President 2002-
2013) and Uhuru Kenyatta (President 2013 – present), as well as Nobel Peace Prize Winner 
Wangari Maathai, former Vice-Presidents Josephat Karanja and George Saitoti (of both Masaai 
and Kikuyu ancestry) and various other notable politicians, musicians, writers, and athletes.  After 
independence Jomo Kenyatta consolidated the state around the Kikuyu, in particular by excluding 
the Luo, the second-largest ethnic group, from power.  This meant conceiving the Luo “as a 
cultural ‘other’ beyond the bounds of Kikuyu civil society, which in any case was coterminous with 
the Kenyatta state,” particularly because they did not practice circumcision and were Andu 
waruguru (“foreigners from the West”) and thus not “legitimate citizens” (Odhiambo, 2004, pp. 178-
179). 
 
President’s Ethnic Group 
 
Mwai Kibaki was President of Kenya between 30 December 2002 and 9 April 2013, and is a 
member of the Kikuyu ethnic group. 
 
 
Madagascar 
 
                                               
2 Fearon groups together all Mande peoples such as the Mandinka, Susu and Guerze/Kpelle. 
3 Fearon combines the Kikuyu with the Meru and the Embu. 
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Core Ethnic Group 
 
The core ethnic group in Madagascar is the Merina, who comprise the largest ethnic group in the 
country according to the Afrobarometer (26.8%), Alesina et al. (25.0%), and Fearon (27.0%).4  The 
Merina kingdom grew in power over the 17th and 18th century and reached its peak in the 19th 
century when it established dominance over the entire island.  The French colonized the country in 
the late 19th century and re-established the capital in Antananarivo, which had been the capital of 
the Merina kingdom since the early 17th century.  The Merina dialect of Malagasy is used as the 
national language in schools and more broadly.  Prominent Merina politicians include Gabriel 
Ramanantsoa (President 1972-1975), Richard Ratsimandrava (President in February 1975), Gilles 
Andriamahazo (President February – June 1975), Marc Ravalomanana (President 2002-2009) and 
Andry Rajoelina (President 2009-2014). 
 
President’s Ethnic Group 
 
Andry Rajoelina was President of Madagascar between 17 March 2009 and 25 January 2014, and 
is a member of the Merina ethnic group. 
 
 
Malawi 
 
Core Ethnic Group 
 
The core ethnic group in Malawi is the Chewa, who comprise the largest ethnic group in the 
country according to the Afrobarometer (33.6%), Alesina et al. (who list them as the Maravi; 
50.0%), Bruk (58.3%) and Fearon (28.0%).  For a majority of years since independence Malawi 
has had a Chewa President, specifically due to Hastings Banda (President 1966-1994).  In 1964 
upon independence Banda renamed the country from Nyasaland (“lake-land” in Yao) to Malawi in 
honour of the pre-colonial Maravi kingdom, which was centred in what is now the Chewa ethnic 
homeland.  Similarly, in 1968 Banda declared Chewa the sole national language of Malawi (to 
which five other languages were added in 1996), and in 1975 he moved the capital from the 
southern city of Blantyre, in a region dominated demographically by the Yao, to Lilongwe in the 
Central Region, historically home to the Chewa. 
 
President’s Ethnic Group 
 
Joyce Banda, née Mtila, was President of Malawi from 7 April 2012 until 31 May 2014, and is from 
the Yao ethnic group.  The Round 5 Afrobarometer survey was conducted between June and July 
2012. 
 
 
Mali 
 
Core Ethnic Group 
 
The core ethnic group in Mali is the Bambara ethnic group, which are part of the larger Mande 
group but which have a distinct identity from the other Mande groups such as the 
Malinke/Mandinke and Dioula/Dyula.  The Bambara comprise the largest ethnic group in the 
country according to the Afrobarometer (32.6%) and Bruk (31.9%), as well as Alesina et al. 
(50.0%) and Fearon (43.0%) which list them under the larger Mande group.  Some 80% of the 
Malian population speaks Bambara as a lingua franca.  For the majority of years since 
independence Mali has been rule by Bambara Presidents, namely Moussa Traoré (President 
1968-1991) and Alpha Oumar Konaré (born to a Bambara father; President 1992-2002).  Due to 
                                               
4 Bruk lists all Malagasy groups together, including the Merina but also the Antaisaka, Betsileo and 
Betsimisaraha, among others. 
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their prominence historically and today there has been a lot of assimilation into the Bambara from 
similar groups such as the Soninke (MacDonald, 2015, p. 120). 
  
President’s Ethnic Group 
 
The President of Mali during the Afrobarometer Round 5 survey (conducted December 2012 – 
January 2013) was Dioncounda Traoré, who was interim President of the country between 12 April 
2012 and 4 September 2013.  For this paper I assume that Traoré, like his clansman Moussa 
Traoré, is a member of the Bambara ethnic group, although it is possible that he is actually from 
the Malinke ethnic group considering his birthplace in the city of Kati is on the border of the 
Bambara and Malinke home ethnic territories according to Murdock (1967). 
 
 
Mauritius 
 
Core Ethnic Group 
 
The core ethnic group in Mauritius is the Hindus, who comprise the largest ethnic group in the 
country according to the Afrobarometer (39.8%, or 46.8% if one includes the separately listed 
Marathi, Tamil and Telegu), Alesina et al. (listed under Indo-Pakistanis; 68.0%), Bruk (listed as 
Indo-Mauritians; 67.5%) and Fearon (51.8%).  Hindus have historically dominated both the civil 
service and the police and have been head of government for the vast majority of years since self-
rule began in the early 1960s, under Seewoosagur Ramgoolam (Chief Minister 1961-1968 and 
Prime Minister after independence 1968-1982), Anerood Jugnauth (Prime Minister 1982-1995, 
2000-2003 and 2014-present) and Navin Ramgoolam (Prime Minister 1995-2000 and 2005-2014).  
Hindus have also served as President (head of state) for all but two years since the country 
became a republic in 1992. 
 
President’s Ethnic Group 
 
As noted above, both the President and Prime Minister of Mauritius at the time of the 
Afrobarometer survey were Hindus in January-February 2012. 
 
 
Mozambique 
 
Core Ethnic Group 
 
The core ethnic group in Mozambique is the Makua, who comprise the largest ethnic group in the 
country according to the Afrobarometer (27.7%), as well as Alesina et al. (47.3%), Bruk (47.3%) 
and Fearon (38.4%) who all appear to group neighbouring northern groups like the Lomwe (4.7% 
in the Afrobarometer) and Ajaua (2.8%) together with the Makua.  The island of Mozambique, 
which was the capital of Portuguese East Africa from the 16th century through 1898, lies just off the 
coast from the ethnic homeland of the Makua in northern Mozambique in what is now Nampula 
province.  Indeed, Nampula province and its surrounding areas held the name of Mozambique 
province in the early twentieth century, such that southern Mozambique was known as Lourenço 
Marques (the colonial name for Maputo), and only had its name changed after independence in the 
late 1970s.  As such one Makua organization from northern Mozambique claimed in the run up to 
independence that they were “the only ethnic group profoundly rooted in Mozambique” and thus 
deserved to have the capital relocated to Nampula (Alpers, 1974, p. 40). 
 
President’s Ethnic Group 
 
Armando Guebuza was President of Mozambique from 2 February 2005 until 15 January 2015.  
He was born to a Ronga father and a mother who was either of Sena or Makua descent depending 
on the source.  In any case he grew up in the Ronga region around Maputo and came to power 
within the southern-dominated FRELIMO party.  I thus code his ethnicity as Ronga. 
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Namibia 
 
Core Ethnic Group 
 
The core ethnic group in Namibia is the Ovambo, which comprise the largest ethnic group in the 
country according to the Afrobarometer (52.4%), Alesina et al. (58.6%), Bruk (49.2%) and Fearon 
(49.8%).  Prominent Ovambo politicians include Sam Nujoma (President 1990-2005), Hifikepunye 
Pohamba (President 2005-2015) and founding member of the South-West African People’s 
Organization (SWAPO) Simon Hafeni Kaukungwa.  Indeed, SWAPO was originally founded as the 
Ovambo People’s Organization in 1959 before its name was changed in 1960 to SWAPO, 
reflecting its goal to liberate all of what was then South-West Africa (Düsing, 2002, p. 123).  Due to 
their demographic prominence Ovambos have dominated government and the civil service more 
broadly, leading “many Namibians of other ethnic background… to conclude that Namibian 
nationalism represents little more than Ovambo ethnicity writ large” (Fosse, 1997, p. 444). 
 
President’s Ethnic Group 
 
Hifikepunye Pohamba was President of Namibia from 21 March 2005 until 21 March 2015, and is 
from the Ovambo ethnic group. 
 
 
Niger 
 
Core Ethnic Group 
 
The core ethnic group in Niger is the Haoussa/Hausa, which comprise a bare majority of the 
population according to the Afrobarometer (51.3%), Alesina et al. (53.0%), Bruk (51.2%) and 
Fearon (54.0%).  Prominent Hausa politicians include Mahamane Ousamane (President 1993-
1996), Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara (President 1996-1999), Daouda Malam Wanké (President April-
December 1999) and Mahamadou Issoufou (President 2011 – present).  The French created the 
first colonial capital in Zinder in 1911 in the Hausa region of south-central Niger before moving it to 
Niamey in 1927 due to their fears about empowering an ethnic group that had such strong ties 
across the border in British Nigeria (Ibrahim, 1994, p. 18).  This shift led to the rise of a 
Zama/Songhai elite from western Niger, who dominated the country’s politics from the 1950s 
through the early 1990s but who began to lose power to the Hausa once the country democratized 
after 1993. 
 
President’s Ethnic Group 
 
Mahamadou Issoufou has been President of Niger since April 2011 and is a member of the Hausa 
ethnic group. 
 
 
Nigeria 
 
Core Ethnic Group 
 
The core ethnic group of Nigeria is the Yoruba, which comprise the second-largest ethnic group in 
the country after the Hausa according to the Afrobarometer (21.4%) and Fearon (20.0%) and tied 
for the largest with the Hausa according to Alesina et al. (21.3%) and Bruk (21.3%).  The Lagos 
Colony was the first British colony established in what would later become Nigeria in 1862 in the 
Yoruba homeland; it later became part of the Southern Nigeria Protectorate in 1900 and Lagos 
became its capital as well as the capital of Nigeria from 1914 until 1991.  Prominent Yoruba 
politicians have included Olusegun Obasanjo (President 1976-1979 and 1999-2007) and Ernest 
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Shonekan (President August-November 1993) as well as other figures such as the Nobel-Prize 
winning author Wole Soyinka and the singer Fela Kuti. 
  
President’s Ethnic Group 
 
Goodluck Jonathan was the President of Nigeria between 5 May 2010 and 29 May 2015; he is 
from the Ijaw ethnic group. 
 
 
Senegal 
 
Core Ethnic Group 
 
The core ethnic group in Senegal is the Wolof, who comprise the largest ethnic group in the 
country according to the Afrobarometer (42.6%), Alesina et al. (48.1%), Bruk (36.2%) and Fearon 
(43.0%).  The French colony of Senegal initially began with the island of Gorée and the 
neighbouring area of what became the capital city of Dakar, which is located within the Wolof 
homeland in western Senegal.  The country takes its name from the Senegal river, which flows 
through the Wolof homeland out past the city of Saint-Louis, which was the colonial capital of 
Senegal until 1902.  Prominent Wolof politicians include Abdou Diouf (President 1980-2000) and 
Abdoulaye Wade (President 2000-2012).  Wolof is the most important lingua franca in Senegal and 
is spoken by up to 90% of the population as either a first or second language, especially in Dakar 
where some 96% of inhabitants speak Wolof.  Indeed, there is evidence for ongoing assimilation 
into the Wolof ethnic group in Dakar among rural-urban migrants from non-Wolof parts of Senegal 
(McLaughlin, 2008). 
 
President’s Ethnic Group 
 
The President of Senegal at the time of the Afrobarometer Round 5 survey in early 2013 was 
Macky Sall, who assumed office on 2 April 2012.  He is of Fula descent. 
 
 
Sierra Leone 
 
Core Ethnic Group 
 
The core ethnic group in Sierra Leone is the Creoles, which comprise one of the smallest ethnic 
groups in the country according to the Afrobarometer (2.9%), Alesina et al. (2.0%), Bruk (1.4%) 
and Fearon (6.0%), or far smaller than the Mende, Temne or Limba, among others.  The Creole 
people originated as freed slaves that immigrated to the country over the course of the late 18th 
and 19th centuries.  They settled the capital city of Freetown and have dominated the economy and 
government much the same way as the Americo-Liberians did next door in Liberia, and their Krio 
language is spoken by up to 95% of the population.  Prominent Creole politicians include a number 
of Governors-General (Henry Boston, 1962-1967; Andrew Juxon-Smith, 1967-1968; Christopher 
Cole, 1971) as well as Valentine Strasser (President 1992-1996) and the last two speakers of the 
Parliament (Edmund Cowan, 2000-2007; Abel Stronge, 2007 – present). 
 
President’s Ethnic Group 
 
Ernest Bai Koroma has been President of Sierra Leone since 17 September 2007 and is a member 
of the Temne ethnic group. 
 
 
South Africa 
 
Core Ethnic Group 
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I code the core ethnic group of South Africa as Blacks, who comprise the largest racial group in the 
country (65.6% according to the Afrobarometer, 72.7% according to Bruk and 76% according to 
Alesina et al. and Fearon).  While it is clear that, prior to the enfranchisement of Blacks in the 
1990s, white South Africans (and especially Afrikaners) viewed themselves as the country’s 
Staatsvolk, the dismantling of apartheid saw a shift towards Blacks as the new ethnic core in South 
Africa.  I code the ethnic core along racial rather than ethnic lines since, due to the country’s 
history of racial oppression and racial categorization under apartheid, race is arguably today a 
more salient identity marker in South Africa than ethnicity.  Indeed, while there was some 
discussion of Xhosa dominance of the ANC under Presidents Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki 
(with reference to the “Xhosa nostra”), race remains the most important social division politically, 
socially and economically.  All four Presidents since the end of apartheid in 1994 have been Black 
(Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Kgalema Motlanthe and Jacob Zuma). 
 
President’s Ethnic Group 
 
Jacob Zuma has been President of South Africa since 9 May 2009 and is Black. 
 
 
Togo 
 
Core Ethnic Group 
 
The core ethnic group of Togo is the Ewé, who comprise the largest ethnic group in the country 
according to the Afrobarometer (36.3% of the population), Bruk (45.4%) and the second-largest 
after the Ouatchi/Mina according to Fearon (20.0%).5  Lomé, in the heart of the Ewé homeland in 
south-west Togo, was established as the capital city of German Togoland in 1897 and has 
continued to be the capital of French Togoland and independent Togo to the present day.  The 
country takes its name from the town of Togoville in the Ewé homeland, where the Ewé King Mlapa 
III signed a treaty with German colonialists in 1884.  The first President of Togo, Sylvanus Olympio, 
was a member of the Ewé ethnic group and promoted Ewé as an official language alongside 
French until his fall from power in 1963.  The Ewe benefitted from favoured access to education 
under both German and French rule, and were thus overrepresented in the civil service at the time 
of independence (Horowitz, 2000, p. 482). 
 
President’s Ethnic Group 
 
Faure Gnassingbé has been President of Togo since 4 May 2005, and is a member of the Kabye 
ethnic group. 
 
 
Uganda 
 
Core Ethnic Group 
 
The core ethnic group in Uganda is the Baganda, who are the largest ethnic group in the country 
according to the Afrobarometer (20.5%), Alesina et al. (17.8%), Bruk (17.8%) and Fearon (16%).  
Prominent Baganda politicians include various Presidents (Edward Mutesa, 1963-1966; Yusuf 
Lule, April-June 1979; Godfrey Binaisa, 1979-1980; and Paulo Muwanga, May 1980), Prime 
Ministers (Benedicto Kiwanuka, Chief Minister 1961-1962 and Prime Minister March-April 1962; 
Kintu Musoke, 1994-1999; Apolo Nsibambi, 1999-2011) and three Vice-Presidents (Samson 
Kisekka 1986-1991, Gilbert Bukenya 2003-2011 and Edward Ssekandi 2011-present).  The 
Buganda kingdom was the first to be colonized by the British in the late 19th century, and the 
kingdom’s capital city of Kampala has remained the capital of Uganda since independence.  The 
nearby city of Entebbe, also within the Baganda homeland, was the colonial capital of the Uganda 
                                               
5 Alesina et al. do not list ethnic groups by name for Togo.  According to the Afrobarometer the Ouatchi and 
Mina together comprise only 5.4% of respondents. 
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Protectorate and currently houses the country’s largest airport.  The country’s name is derived from 
the Swahili word for Buganda, which in the past has led some Ugandans to consider changing its 
name to make it more ethnically neutral (as has happened in other African states). 
 
President’s Ethnic Group 
 
Yoweri Museveni has been President of Uganda since 29 January 1986 and is a member of the 
Banyankole ethnic group. 
 
 
Zambia 
 
Core Ethnic Group 
 
The core ethnic group in Zambia is the Bemba, who comprise the largest ethnic group in the 
country according to the Afrobarometer (27.0%), Alesina et al. (37%), Bruk (35.2%) and Fearon 
(43.0%, who lists ethnicity by language and thus has higher percentages for both the Bemba and 
the Nyanja than the other sources).  Prominent Bemba politicians in Zambia include Frederick 
Chiluba (President 1991-2002) and Michael Sata (President 2011-2014) as well as former Vice-
President Simon Kapwepwe (1967-1970).  The Bemba have long been the dominant group not 
only in their home region in northern Zambia but also as urban migrants to the capital city of 
Lusaka and the Copperbelt region in central Zambia.  They have thus long been overly 
represented in both union and political activities dating back to the colonial period, such that one of 
the long-standing problems in post-colonial Zambian politics has been to balance Bemba 
dominance with non-Bemba interests (Horowitz, 2000, pp. 430-432). 
 
President’s Ethnic Group 
 
Michael Sata was President of Zambia from 23 September 2011 until 28 October 2014, and was a 
member of the Bemba ethnic group. 
 
 
Zimbabwe 
 
Core Ethnic Group 
 
The core ethnic group in Zimbabwe is the Shona, who comprise a majority of the population 
according to Alesina et al. (76.0%), Bruk (69.8%) and Fearon (77.0%), and who comprise 27.1% 
according to the Afrobarometer but 62.5% if one includes Shona sub-groups like the 
Zezuru/Central Shona (14.5%), Karanga/Southern Shona (12.8%) and the Korekore/Northern 
Shona (8.0%).  The Shona descend from the inhabitants of the medieval Kingdom of Zimbabwe, 
from which the country took its name when it was renamed from Rhodesia upon independence in 
1980.  Prominent Shona politicians include Robert Mugabe (Prime Minister 1980-1987 and 
President 1987 – present) and Morgan Tsvangirai (Prime Minister 2009-2013) as well as Vice-
Presidents Joseph Msika (1999-2009), Joice Mujuru (2004-2014) and Emmerson Mnangagwa 
(2014 – present).  The capital city of Harare (formerly Salisbury) is squarely situated in the middle 
of the Shona homeland, as is the medieval ruins of the Great Zimbabwe from which the country 
takes its name. 
 
President’s Ethnic Group 
 
Robert Mugabe has been President of Zimbabwe since 22 December 1987; he is a member of the 
Shona ethnic group. 
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Part B: Afrobarometer Round 4 
 
By definition there are no changes to the ethnic cores across the dataset between round four, 
which was conducted between 2008 and 2009, and round five, but in five cases there was a 
change in the President’s ethnic group, which I discuss below. 
 
Malawi 
 
Bingu wa Mutharika was the President of Malawi between 24 May 2004 and 4 April 2012, when he 
passed away with a heart attack and was succeeded by Joyce Banda.  He was a member of the 
Lhomwe ethnic group. 
 
Mali 
 
Amadou Toumani Touré was the President of Mali between 8 June 2002 and 22 March 2012, 
when he was deposed in a coup d'état by a group of army officers led by Amadou Sanogo.  He is a 
member of the Peulh/Fula ethnic group. 
 
Nigeria 
 
Umaru Musa Yar'Adua was President of Nigeria between 29 May 2007 and 5 May 2010, when he 
died from natural causes and was succeeded by Goodluck Jonathan.  Yar’Adua was a member of 
the Fula/Fulani ethnic group. 
 
Senegal 
 
Abdoulaye Wade was the President of Senegal between 1 April 2000 and 2 April 2012, when he 
lost in a national election to Macky Sall.  Wade is a member of the Wolof ethnic group. 
  
Zambia  
 
Rupiah Banda was the President of Zambia from 29 June 2008 to 23 September 2011, when he 
lost to Michael Sata in a national election.  He is a member of the Chewa ethnic group. 
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